Wall Street Journal
December 19, 2003
Pg. 14
Think Global, Fight Local
By Robert D. Kaplan
Two years ago this month, fewer than 100 men of the Army's 5th Special
Forces Group, based out of Fort Campbell, Ky. -- almost all of them
non-commissioned officers -- essentially took down the Taliban regime on
their own. Along with a handful of Air Force Special Ops embeds, they
succeeded where the British and the Soviets before them in Afghanistan
had failed, because they had been given no specific instructions. The
bureaucratic layers between the U.S. forces and the secretary of defense
were severed. They were told merely to link up with the "indigs"
(indigenous Northern Alliance and friendly Pushtun elements) and make it
happen.
The result was that they grew beards and rode horses from one redoubt to
the next, even as their team sergeants called in air strikes
without first
seeking written approval. Because 5th Group was allowed to operate
independently of the vertical, Industrial Age hierarchy of the Pentagon,
and because it combined 19th-century warfare with 21st-century close air
support (CAS), 5th Group achieved the very post-industrial military
"transformation" that elites in Washington are incessantly talking about,
but
don't seem to understand -- because real transformation, which involves
the
dilution of central control, would make many of these elites themselves
redundant.
But now, military transformation is receding behind us in Afghanistan.
With Saddam Hussein in custody, the Pentagon is focusing on
the capture of
Osama bin Laden, who may be in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. Yet
success against bin Laden means going back to what we did right two
years ago.
Of the roughly 10,000 American troops in Afghanistan, only a fraction of
them are doing anything directly pivotal to the stabilization of the
country. The rest are either part of a long support tail or part of
newly-created layers of command at Bagram Air Base, north of Kabul,
which micro-manage and complicate the work of a relatively small number
of
Army SF troops (Green Berets) located at various "fire bases."
Instead of powering-down to a flattened hierarchy of small, autonomous
units dispersed over a wide area -- what the 1940 Marine "Small Wars
Manual"
recommends for fighting a guerrilla insurgency -- we have barricaded
ourselves into a mammoth, Cold War-style base at Bagram that drains
resources from the fire bases. It is ironic that just as the Pentagon is
proposing a more light and lethal worldwide basing posture (with many
smaller footprints rather than a few large ones in Korea and Europe), in
Afghanistan, whose mountains and tribes make it the most unconventional
of battlefields, we have reverted to such an antiquated arrangement.
Half of the U.S. soldiery in Afghanistan is garrisoned at Bagram,
creating a footprint so large, so vulnerable, and so
beside the point of why we are
there in the first place, that terms like "Westmorelandization,"
"Sovietization" and the "self-licking ice cream cone" come to mind when
describing the place and what it represents. I make these harsh
statements after a month embedded at various SF fire bases in
Afghanistan, speaking
to dozens of non-commissioned and middle level officers, and drawing upon
my own experience of covering the mujahideen insurgency against the
Soviets
in the 1980s.
Because of the present U.S. force structure in Afghanistan -- with its
emphasis on conventional military and support personnel as opposed to
small detachments of Green Berets, civil affairs units and other Special
Ops
teams -- I met no one on the ground doing the fighting who believed
that
merely increasing the number of troops in the country would
accomplish anything
except make these problems worse.
Surprise searches of suspect mud-walled fortresses and "presence
patrols" over the Afghan countryside require the approval of
a CON-OP, a written
"Concept of Operation" proposal. Two years ago -- in the immediate
aftermath of 9/11, when the emphasis was on results rather than on
regulations --
CON-Ops were de-emphasized. Indeed, again as recommended in the Marine
"Small Wars Manual," verbal orders had replaced written ones. But now it
can take days for commanders in far-flung parts of Afghanistan to
get
CON-Ops approved; and even then often in diluted, risk-averse form.
The result
is that suspicious compounds are assaulted hours and days after
they should
have been, so they that they turn up to be "dry holes" rather than "gold
mines" of weapons and MVTs (middle value targets), the al Qaeda and
Taliban sub-commanders who exist between the terrorist leadership
and the foot
soldiers.
The search for HVTs (high value targets) such as bin Laden has not been
similarly compromised. That is because the various "Delta" and other
"black" Special Ops elements hunting down the HVTs have air support
at near the
battalion level. These commandos operate more like 5th Group did in
2001, cut loose from Bagram's and the Pentagon's dinosaurian
organizational
structure -- in the manner of the most innovative corporations, which
are deliberately kept weak at the center.
But even the search for HVTs is hurt by the overly regulated approach of
hunting down the MVTs and LVTs (Low Value Targets). For it is the hunt
for MVTs that constitutes the real bread and butter in the War on
Terrorism.
If the hunt for MVTs remains snarled in bureaucracy, the MVTs will
fill the
positions of any HVTs who happen to be killed or apprehended. More
importantly, MVTs hold the key to capturing the HVTs. It's the subway
turnstile phenomenon. When New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani began
arresting kids for jumping turnstiles, a percentage of them turned
out to be
wanted for more serious crimes, or they had information on those who were.
To
wit, it was MVTs who proved crucial in the capture of Saddam. Thus,
we need
to be capturing more MVTs. We can only do that by giving Army SF the same
autonomy and air support that Delta has.
Demanding more troops without a thorough consideration of these issues
is irresponsible: It would only encourage a longer support tail and more
bureaucracy. (A similar caveat applies to calls for more NATO
stabilization troops to help provide basic security to the
population, an increase
that would be appropriate if NATO is prepared to decentralize its
forces and
its command structure in Afghanistan.)
Some in the field recommend scaling back Bagram, and moving some
functions over the border to Khanabad-Kharshi (K2) in Uzbekistan. As
Bagram
contracts, the number of fire bases should proliferate, even as they
become more
independent. In particular, we need more and smaller Advanced Operating
Bases in southwestern Afghanistan close to the Iran border. At the
moment, fewer than 100 Green Berets are covering southern Afghanistan in
armed
convoys: the addition of just another 100 or so of them would have a
substantial force-multiplier effect.
We also need more Provincial Reconstruction Teams -- mobile civil affairs
units working the soft, humanitarian side of Unconventional War. As with
the
Green Berets, the addition of a relatively small number of these
personnel
will have dramatically positive consequences.
Like the Soviets, we face dispersed, small groupings of insurgents
attacking
us from rear bases over the border in Pakistan. Thus, we have to make the
Pakistani tribal agencies the next laboratory of Unconventional War. The
model to be used should be that of the southern Philippines in 2002, when
the 1st Special Forces Group -- based out of Okinawa, Japan and Fort
Lewis, Washington -- flushed Abu Sayyaf insurgents off the island of
Basilan
without firing a shot. The Green Berets built schools, dug wells and
provided medical assistance to a downtrodden Muslim population, while
giving the credit for this humanitarian work to the Philippine
Army. In this
way, the Green Berets severed the link between the insurgents and
the
indigenous inhabitants. We need to do something similar with the Pakistani
military
inside the tribal agencies.
We are fighting a world-wide counterinsurgency, and you don't hunt down
pockets of insurgents over vast swaths of the earth with large bases,
large
infantry columns, and central control. Operation Iraqi Freedom only
shaped
the battlefield for the war in Iraq, which is of a small, unconventional
kind. Because insurgencies vary from country to country, and even within
countries, it is necessary to divest power from places like Washington
and
Bagram to the edges of the command structure, where non-comms at
Advanced Operating Bases constitute the sensitive, finger-tip
points of defense
policy -- tailored to the particular situation in their respective
micro-regions. For
example, while the U.S. seeks to fold the Afghan Militia
Forces into the newly
created Afghan National Army, in some provinces these same
militias are vital
to the security of our SF fire bases. Therefore, decisions about
integrating these
forces must be left to individual base commanders, who are familiar with
local personalities.
The U. S. military is the world's best because its sergeants and warrant
officers are without equal. It is a matter of better utilizing them.
Mistakes will occur, like the children killed recently near Gardez, but
remember that Green Berets have been regularly saving the lives of young
mine victims in rural Afghanistan.
In El Salvador in the 1980s, 55 SF troops beat back a guerrilla
insurgency
while gradually integrating renegade militias into a newly
professionalized
national army. They had advantages, though. A force cap kept the number
of
uniformed Americans in the country from mushrooming, and except for some
basic guidelines they were given relatively limited instructions. So the
question is:
Can we find our way back to 2001 in Afghanistan and to 2002 in
the Philippines, when the 5th and 1st SF Groups led the way to military
transformation?
Mr. Kaplan, a correspondent for Atlantic Monthly, is the author of
"Soldiers of God" (Vintage, 2001).